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Agent Tells of Sex and Spies

.S. Embassy in Poland

CPYRGHT

By CLARK MOLLENHOFF CPYRE Tribune Correspondent

WASHINGTON, D. C. subversion in the U.S. Embassy in Poland was so extensive that chief security conditions in the U.S. Emevaluator Otto F. Otepka could hardly believe it.

Agency (CIA) assured Otepka and the then Deputy Un-Henderson that it came from bassy at night. a reliable informant who was

It was early in 1959, and KGB. the CIA officials said they

State Security) network, and by employing a handsome had agreed to remain in his debonair young Communist, The information on sex and job as a "stip" or stay-in- the CIA undercover agent re-

THE INFORMATION on him for a week. dersecretary of State Loy run of the barracks and em- it yet.

identity of the man for he cers in the U.S. Embassy had and positions.

ported. She had lived with

SHE HAD BEEN photogbassy in Warsaw was shock- raphed, and the KGB had ing. Polish party girls, acting plans to try to use this But three high officials as agents for the KGB, had material and a money pay-from the Central Intelligence seduced nearly all of the off to obtain security informembers of the Marine guard mation from her husband, in sending information from and were given a rather free The husband did not know of Goleniewski to the State De-

The informant stated that reported that there were othgence apparatus. They made a special trip to convey the officer, was in fact acting had been compromised important information.

It was contained to the state of this important information. as a foreign agent for the through sex and money who KGB. Were delivering information was given information that was passed to the subversive section in the Washington could give no clues as to the highest foreign service offi- the details on their names field office.

-After explaining the story of Soviet espionage in the of immigrants or Polish em-United States Embassy, the and Henderson that they Communist spy apparatus. were following up the infor-mation and that no major tounded at the amount of pre-State Department probe cise information. would be necessary.

that action to remove the se- from Goleniewski were to be curity risks from the em-bassy should be done slowly The security office and with a great deal of cau-gram was simply to move their ranks.

derson knew at the time that questioned. the informant was a man known to the CIA as Lt. Michael Goleniewski, a high ranking KGB intelligence officer stationed in Poland. -

was still operating in the made a trip to Moscow where KGB (Soviet Committee for the Soviets had seduced her ienced intelligence agent here. feared that he would be exposed by Soviet agents in the CTA if he used his actual

name. He operated through a 'cutout" or third person he: trusted rather than directly through the CIA.

The CIA also sought to proteet the identity more, and used still another code name partment, the FBI and other The CIA undercover agent. U.S. intelligence agencies.

> was given information that section in the Washington

Goleniewski's code name was used in reporting lists bassy officials in Washington CIA officers assured Otepka who were in fact part of a

The information was reli-The CIA officials stated able, the FBI reported. Leads

The security office protion, for any unusual activity with caution. The members might alert the KGB to the of the Marine guard were rofact that they had a spy in tated out of Warsaw to Bonn and Frankfurt, West Ger-NEITHER Otepka nor Hen-many, where they could be

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